Things used to be predictable: Donald Tusk was to run for the presidency and, at least according to opinion polls, easily beat the then-incumbent Lech Kaczyński. That would be a return match and a payback for the 2005 elections when Kaczyński won in the second round, beating Tusk by 54-46%. (Image: Komorowski, from RIA Novosti)
Things changed a bit in January, when Tusk, the prime minister since 2007, announced that he would not run in the presidential elections, set for Autumn 2010. This was a reasonable decision. After all, the prime minister in the Polish system enjoys much more power than the president does. In March, the Civic Platform, the ruling party, organised primary elections, won by Bronisław Komorowski, speaker of the Sejm, the lower chamber of the Parliament. Polls showed that the new candidate would clearly win the presidential vote.
Things changed dramatically on April 10th, when Lech Kaczyński died in a plane crash near Smoleńsk, Russia, together with his wife and 94 other people, including members of Parliament, the governor of the central bank and top military commanders. This was a shock and trauma, more for Polish society than for the state, as the latter proved to be resilient and its strong institutions worked well. According to the Polish constitution, in such an event, the Speaker of the Sejm becomes the Acting President; so Komorowski, a candidate for the presidency, suddenly became Acting President. One of his duties was to call emergency elections: the date is set for June 20th, with a possible second round on July 4th.
The Smolensk crash left Law and Justice, the major opposition party, without a candidate for the presidential elections. The vacuum was soon to be filled when Jarosław Kaczyński, founder and leader of Law and Justice and twin-brother of Lech, decided to run for the presidency. (Photo: Kaczynski, from tolerance.ca)
The scene is set, the actors are known, and the most likely scenario is that Komorowski wins, although not in the first round. Opinion polls show that the current acting president would win some 45-47% of votes, while Kaczyński enjoys the support of some 30-35% of Poles. Such results would make a second round necessary and, according to the polls, Komorowski should win. And let's assume that this scenario comes true. Then both are happy: Komorowski moves to the presidential palace and Kaczyński achieves a more-than-decent result, which is a solid base ahead of the parliamentary elections, scheduled for 2011. The Civic Platform can launch the reform in public finance while earlier, any fiscal tightening would have probably been vetoed by the late president Kaczyński. (One could say that, with Komorowski in charge, the Civic Platform will lose its excuse not to push the necessary reforms forward).
Komorowski, a father of five and a passionate hunter, represents the moderate-conservative fraction of the Civic Platform. In parliament since 1991, he is an experienced politician; in 2000-2001 he was the minister of defence in Jerzy Buzek's government. However, he has neither charisma, nor is he a dynamic leader. If elected, he may reduce the role of the president in Polish politics. The Polish constitution gives the president a strong mandate and legitimacy, as he is elected by popular vote - some 8,5 million of Poles voted for Kaczyński in the second round of the 2005 elections. Yet this does not translate into power: the president can only block the government and parliament by vetoing laws, and his veto can be overruled in the Sejm by a 3/5 majority. The Polish president can hardly create policies or influence the executive. The American system is ‘presidential', the French is ‘semi-presidential', and the Polish is ‘quarter-presidential'. The Polish president, despite strong support of millions of Poles, is confined to the rather narrow framework of ceremonial head of state. Lech Kaczyński did not feel well with these limitations and tried to expand his powers by interpreting the Constitution in his own favour. This attitude, combined with blocking powers, caused some conflicts with the Tusk government: the cohabitation was a difficult one. Komorowski, if elected, may remove this problem. The ‘large' and ‘small' palaces, as the president's and prime minister's offices are unofficially called in Warsaw, would be in hands of one party. This could facilitate reforms and changes the Civic Platform often spoke about but never tried to actually implement, saying that Lech Kaczyński would certainly veto them. The ruling coalition was too weak to override the veto in the Sejm. What is more, Komorowski's personality may suggest that he would not try to expand his powers but be content with the ceremonial and representative aspects of his office.
Is it possible that Komorowski will not win? Kaczyński's advisers know that their boss has a confrontational personality, so they decided to limit his presence in the media. This may seem awkward, but it works. Kaczyński, single and childless, does not show up on live TV shows or debates, does not deliver rousing speeches during electoral rallies, and avoids questions during press conferences. Every single appearance is carefully planned and directed, like his speech to the Russians aired on Youtube in early May, aiming to show that Jarosław Kaczyński is not a Russophobe. It is hard to say what Kaczyński's program is, but to be honest, the same can be said about Komorowski. Kaczyński's clever tactics, combined with a mixture of post-Smoleńsk trauma and compassion, give him the support of 30-35% Poles, roughly twice as much as his brother had enjoyed in the last weeks before his death. What is more, Komorowski's campaign is not very skillful and full of gaffes, such as silly comments that water "simply drains away," in the middle of the massive flood in Poland in May. General feelings about Komorowski as the acting president are mixed.
So what would happen if Kaczyński won? Poland would simply return to status quo ante, with all the charm of cohabitation. One should not expect the twin brothers to differ much. We would again see all the faults in the design of the Polish constitution. And the government would have a hard life, but also someone to blame. It is difficult to believe that Smoleńsk changed anything in the behaviour of the Polish political class - things have changed, but they stayed the same. Plus ça change, plus c'est pareil.
Filip Dutkowski earned a degree in International Relations at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, where he studied a bit of everything within the framework of Individual Interfaculty Studies of Humanities. Later he graduated from the College of Europe in Natolin, Warsaw. Radical football fan, connoisseur of beer, keen traveler. Author of a guidebook to Iceland; co-author of a guidebook to Spain. Pretends to have read more books than he actually did. A true burgher of the Royal City of Kraków and a loyal subject of the Habsburg monarchy. Currently works in the Polish Press Agency (PAP).
